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___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
This case comes to the Court as a certified interlocutory 
appeal. The sole question presented is whether, under Section 
11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k, a nonvoting 
board observer affiliated with an issuer’s placement agent is a 
“person who, with his consent, is named in the registration 
statement as being or about to become a director[ ] [or] person 
performing similar functions . . . .” Id. § 77k(a)(3).  
We think not. As required by the text of § 77k(a)(3), our 
inquiry begins and ends with the registration statement’s 
description of the Defendants. We hold as a matter of law that 
the Defendants’ functions are not “similar” to those that board 
directors perform, so we will reverse the District Court’s order 
and direct the entry of summary judgment for the Defendants. 
I1 
Tibet Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is a holding company. 
Through an array of parent-subsidiary relationships and 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and 
exercise plenary review over the question certified. Florence v. 
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296, 
301 (3d Cir. 2010). We review the District Court’s denial of 
summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard it 
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contractual rights, Tibet “effectively control[led]” Yunnan 
Shangri-La Tibetan Pharmaceutical Group Limited (Yunnan), 
an operating company that manufactured and sold traditional 
Tibetan medicines. Dartell v. Tibet Pharm., Inc., 2017 WL 
1944106, at *2 (D.N.J. May 10, 2017). This case involves 
Tibet’s attempt to raise capital for those operations through an 
initial public offering (IPO). 
Hayden Zou was an early investor in Tibet and the sole 
director of China Tibetan Pharmaceuticals Limited, a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Tibet. Tibet’s ability to control Yunnan 
flowed through China Tibetan. In late 2009, Zou told L. 
McCarthy Downs, III, a managing director at the investment 
bank Anderson & Strudwick, Inc. (A&S), about Tibet. The two 
discussed the prospect of a Tibet IPO, and A&S later agreed to 
serve as Tibet’s placement agent. Zou and Downs then worked 
together to bring Tibet public. Tibet’s IPO registration 
statement became effective in late 2010.  
Zou and Downs were neither signatories to the 
registration statement nor named in it as directors of Tibet. 
Instead, they were listed as nonvoting board observers chosen 
by A&S. Though Zou and Downs would have no formal 
powers or duties, the registration statement explained “they 
may nevertheless significantly influence the outcome of 
matters submitted to the Board of Directors for approval.” App. 
178. 
                                                 
should apply. See Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 911 F.2d 960, 
963 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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As it turned out, the registration statement2 omitted 
material negative information about Yunnan’s finances. 
Yunnan had defaulted on a loan from the Chinese government 
a few months before Tibet’s registration statement became 
effective and that default led to a judgment that required 
repayment within 60 days. Though the registration statement 
described a “long term loan,” it said nothing about the default 
judgment.  
Just before Tibet filed its amended final prospectus, the 
Chinese government froze all of Yunnan’s assets. Tibet did not 
disclose that either. The IPO closed soon thereafter, and Tibet 
and its underwriters offered 3 million shares to the public at 
$5.50 per share. But Yunnan still hadn’t paid what it owed, so 
the Agricultural Bank of China auctioned off the company’s 
assets. This prompted the NASDAQ to halt trading in Tibet’s 
stock, and its price plummeted.  
Plaintiffs sued Zou, Downs, Tibet, A&S, the IPO’s 
auditor, and several other Defendants on behalf of a class of 
stock purchasers. As relevant to this certified interlocutory 
                                                 
2 We note the District Court used the term “prospectus,” 
not “registration statement” for the central document in this 
case. That was accurate, but for our purposes there is no 
difference between the two. That’s because Tibet’s amended 
final prospectus, filed post-effectiveness under Rule 424, is 
considered part of its registration statement. See Regulation C, 
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.404, 230.430B(d). Because this appeal 
concerns Securities Act § 11 registration statement liability, not 
§ 12 prospectus liability, we use the term “registration 
statement” to avoid confusion. We use the term “final 
prospectus” in the next paragraph for chronological clarity. 
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appeal, Plaintiffs alleged Zou and Downs violated Section 11 
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).  
II 
Section 11 imposes near-strict liability for untruths and 
omissions made in a registration statement. See In re Suprema 
Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 269 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Unlike antifraud cases, a § 11 plaintiff need not allege scienter, 
reliance,3 or loss causation. See In re Constar Int’l Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 585 F.3d 774, 782–783 (3d Cir. 2009); In re Morgan 
Stanley Info. Fund Sec. Litig., 592 F.3d 347, 359 (2d Cir. 
2010). Congress imposed this in terrorem liability on those best 
positioned to ensure accurate disclosure. In re Lehman Bros. 
Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig., 650 F.3d 167, 181 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381–
82 & n.13 (1983)). 
Because § 11 is such strong medicine, and to meet its 
purpose of enforcing accurate registration statement 
disclosure, it applies only to limited and enumerated categories 
of defendants. See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 381–82; 
Lehman Bros., 650 F.3d at 185 (“It is precisely because § 11 
‘gives rise to liability more readily,’ however, that it is [sic] 
applies ‘more narrowly’ than § 10(b).” (quoting Morgan 
Stanley, 592 F.3d at 359–60)). Among those defendants is 
“every person who, with his consent, is named in the 
registration statement as being or about to become a director, 
                                                 
3 Unless they bought their securities more than 12 
months after the registration statement became effective, 15 
U.S.C. § 77k(a). 
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person performing similar functions, or partner.” 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77k(a)(3).  
The District Court, finding there were material issues of 
fact about whether Zou and Downs had been named as people 
“performing similar functions to a director,” Dartell, 2017 WL 
1944106, at *12, denied summary judgment. At the outset, the 
Court held that only the Defendants’ description in the 
registration statement itself is relevant to the inquiry. Turning 
to the merits, the Court observed Zou and Downs were named 
in the registration statement as about to become “board 
observers” appointed by Tibet’s placement agent. In a section 
titled “Relationship with our Placement Agent,” the 
registration statement describes their role:  
We will have an ongoing relationship with our 
Placement Agent that may impact our 
shareholders’ ability to impact decisions 
related to our operations. 
In connection with this offering, we have agreed 
to allow our Placement Agent to designate two 
non-voting observers to our Board of Directors 
until the earlier of the date that: (i) the investors 
that purchase shares in this offering beneficially 
own less than five percent (5%) of our 
outstanding shares; or (ii) the trading price per 
share is at least [$24 per share] for any 
consecutive 15 trading day period. Although our 
Placement Agent’s observers will not be able to 
vote, they may nevertheless significantly 
influence the outcome of matters submitted to 
the Board of Directors for approval.  
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App. 178; see App. 230. 
After acknowledging that Zou and Downs would not be 
able to vote, the District Court observed “they may 
nevertheless significantly influence the outcome of matters 
submitted to the Board of Directors for approval.” Dartell, 
2017 WL 1944106, at *10. In the Court’s view, because Zou 
and Downs had the power to “influence,” this meant they 
“arguably had more influence than any individual board 
member, who could only cast a single vote.” Id. “The Court’s 
only hesitation” in denying summary judgment was that the 
registration statement used the word “may” rather than “shall” 
or “will.” Id. at *11. That meant it “was not necessarily 
mandatory that the Board Observers exercise their ‘significant 
influence.’” Id. Still, the Court determined that whether Zou 
and Downs were covered by § 11 was a jury question. Id. 
Zou and Downs moved for certification of that order 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The District Court granted the 
motion, finding the underlying legal question—whether Zou 
and Downs could be liable under § 11—met the requirements 
of § 1292(b). First, the District Court found the question was a 
controlling question of law, because its conclusion would 
create reversible error if we disagreed on appeal. Second, the 
District Court found there was substantial ground for 
difference of opinion, despite the question being one of first 
impression in the courts of appeals, because “Section 11 is 
narrowly construed” and reasonable jurists could therefore 
disagree with its conclusion. Dartell v. Tibet Pharm., Inc., 2018 
WL 994896, at *5 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2018). Finally, the Court 
thought an interlocutory appeal would materially advance the 
ultimate termination of the litigation, because it had already 
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granted summary judgment for Zou and Downs on all counts 
save the one alleging § 11 liability. If we disagreed with the 
District Court, the litigation would thus be at an end. So the 
District Court certified the following question: 
Can Defendants be potentially liable under 
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, each as 
a “person performing similar functions” to a 
director, in light of Defendants’ role as board 
observers who could (but did not necessarily 
have to) significantly influence the outcome of 
matters submitted to the board of directors for 
approval? 
Order at 2, No. 2-14-cv-03620 (D.N.J. Feb. 21, 2018), ECF No. 
313. We granted Zou and Downs’s timely Petition for 
Permission to Appeal and now reverse.4 
III 
The Securities Act does not define “director,” so we turn 
to dictionary definitions from the time Congress enacted the 
statute. See New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 
(2019). “Director” could mean “[o]ne who . . . directs, rules, or 
guides; a guide, a conductor; ‘one that has authority over 
                                                 
4 The District Court granted Zou and Downs’s motions 
for summary judgment “with respect to their liability pursuant 
to [§ 77k(a)(2)],” Order at 1, No. 2-14-cv-03620 (D.N.J. May 
10, 2017), ECF No. 269, and the parties have litigated this 
interlocutory appeal solely under § 77k(a)(3). We follow the 
parties’ lead in addressing only § 77k(a)(3), and express no 
opinion on the correctness of the District Court’s summary 
judgment for Zou and Downs under § 77k(a)(2). 
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others; a superintendent; [or] one that has the general 
management of design or work.’” Director, Oxford English 
Dictionary 392 (1st ed. 1933). Or, in a more specialized sense 
related to business organizations, it could mean “[a] member 
of a board appointed to direct or manage the affairs of a 
commercial corporation or company.” Id.; see Directors, 
Black’s Law Dictionary 581 (3d ed. 1933) (defining “director” 
as a “person[ ] appointed or elected according to law, 
authorized to manage and direct the affairs of a corporation or 
company”). 
Because § 77k(a)(3) also lists “partner[s]” (in context, 
another business organization title) and because § 77k(a) lists 
other statutory defendants by technical titles (“underwriters” 
for example), it seems clear enough Congress meant “director” 
in the second, specialized sense. See Yates v. United States, 135 
S. Ct. 1074, 1085 (2015) (“[A] word is known by the company 
it keeps.”); Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 609 (1973) 
(“[T]he law uses familiar legal expressions in their familiar 
legal sense.” (quoting Henry v. United States, 251 U.S. 393, 
395 (1920))).  
Beyond the text of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act 
definition of director—which uses the phrase “director of a 
corporation”—reinforces our conclusion. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78c(a)(7) (“The term ‘director’ means any director of a 
corporation or any person performing similar functions with 
respect to any organization, whether incorporated or 
unincorporated.”). So does Securities Act Regulation C, which 
defines “director” the same way. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405.5 
                                                 
5 An amendment to the Securities Act suggests later 
Congresses agreed. The Private Securities Litigation Reform 
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What functions, then, typify directorship? “The whole 
of the directors collectively form the board of directors.” 
Directors, Black’s Law Dictionary 581 (3d ed. 1933). Acting 
as a board, directors are the corporation’s agents. 2 Fletcher 
Cyc. Corp. § 507 (Sept. 2018 update); 4 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. 
§ 2261 (1918). The board manages the corporation’s affairs by: 
(1) selecting senior officers; (2) controlling executive 
compensation; (3) delegating administrative authority to 
officers; (4) making high level corporate policy; (5) deciding 
financing and capital allocation; and (6) supervising the 
“welfare of the whole enterprise.” 2 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 505 
(Sept. 2018 update); see 4 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. §§ 1729, 1961, 
1966 (1918); Blasband v. Rales, 971 F.2d 1034, 1044 (3d Cir. 
1992). Directors owe duties of reasonable care and loyalty. 
3 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 990 (Sept. 2018 update); see 4 Fletcher 
Cyc. Corp. § 2261 (1918) (“[W]hether or not directors and 
other corporate officers are strictly trustees, there can be no 
doubt that their character is that of a fiduciary so far as the 
corporation and the stockholders as a body are concerned.”). 
And if shareholders are unhappy with directors, they can vote 
them out for any reason (or no reason). 3 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. 
§ 357.20 (Sept. 2018 update). At the most basic level, directors 
are thus defined by their formal power to direct and manage a 
                                                 
Act of 1995 amended § 77k(f) to make “outside directors” 
proportionately (rather than jointly and severally) liable. See 
Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 201(b), 109 Stat. 737, 762 (1995). By 
specifying “outside directors,” a corporate term of art for 
“nonemployee director[s] with little or no direct interest in the 
corporation,” Director, Black’s Law Dictionary 473 (7th ed. 
1999), the amendment suggests “director” is used in the 
corporate-law sense rather than the word’s broadest sense. 
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corporation, and the responsibilities and duties that accompany 
those powers.6 
                                                 
6 Plaintiffs point to two Exchange Act SEC interpretive 
releases they say suggest a broader definition. See Obasi Br. 
23–25 (discussing Ownership Reports & Trading by Officers, 
Directors & Principal Sec. Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 
17991, 1991 WL 292000 (Feb. 21, 1991) and Interpretive 
Release on Rules Applicable to Insider Reporting & Trading, 
Exchange Act Release No. 18114, 1981 WL 31301 (Sept. 24, 
1981)). Those releases say a person’s title should not determine 
“whether an advisory, emeritus or honorary director is a 
director for Section 16 purposes,” Release No. 17991, 1991 
WL 292000, at *4, and that the focus should instead be on 
whether the person performs duties likely to make him privy to 
inside information, see id.; Release No. 18114, 1981 WL 
31301, at *5 & n.15. But they do not undermine our analysis 
for two reasons. 
First, the releases interpret the meaning of “officers and 
directors” “for Section 16 purposes.” Release No. 17991, 1991 
WL 292000, at *4; see Release No. 18114, 1981 WL 31301, at 
*5 & n.15. The releases’ purposive interpretations revolve 
around access to inside information because § 16 is an insider 
trading provision. See Release No. 17991, 1991 WL 292000, 
at *2; Release No. 18114, 1981 WL 31301, at *5 & n.15; see 
also Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Sec. Co., 423 U.S. 
232, 253 (1976) (“Congress thought that all short-swing 
trading by directors and officers was vulnerable to abuse 
because of their intimate involvement in corporate affairs.”). 
But § 11 is about ensuring the accuracy of registration 
statements in securities offerings by issuers, not deterring 
short-swing profiting by insiders through mandated disclosure 
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of holdings and trades. Compare Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers 
Dist. Council Const. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318, 
1323 (2015) (“Section 11 of the Act promotes compliance with 
these disclosure provisions by giving purchasers a right of 
action against an issuer or designated individuals . . . .”) with 1 
Louis Loss et al., Securities Regulation 6.E.1 (6th ed. 2018) 
(“[S]ection 16 remains a useful tool for preventing speculative 
abuses by insiders and for focusing their attention on their 
fiduciary duty and on long-term corporate health, rather than 
on short-term trading profits . . . .” (quoting Report of the Task 
Force on Regulation of Insider Trading—Part II: Reform of 
Section 16, 42 Bus. Law. 1087, 1092 (1987))). 
 Section 16’s divergent goals manifest in reasoning that 
would make little sense in the § 11 context. Release No. 17991 
explains, for instance, that the terms “[o]fficers, directors, and 
ten percent holders . . . . also include[ ] an officer or director 
who has terminated officer or director status but continues to 
be subject to reporting under Section 16.” 1991 WL 292000, at 
*2 n.14. That expansion of the term’s definition may be well-
advised in the insider trading context. But it has no connection 
to the registration statement disclosures § 11 is meant to reach, 
since former directors have no input into registration 
statements. 
Second, and as we explain infra in Part IV, the 
§ 77k(a)(3) inquiry is limited to the face of the registration 
statement. That limitation is based on language in § 77k(a)(3) 
(“named in the registration statement as”) that does not appear 
in § 16. See § 16(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1) (“Every person 
who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 
10 percent of any class of any equity security . . . or who is a 
director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file the 
14 
 
“Similar,” as the term is used in § 77k(a)(3), is most 
aptly defined as “[h]aving a marked resemblance or likeness; 
of a like nature or kind.” Similar, Oxford English Dictionary 
59 (1st ed. 1933). True, there are varying degrees of likeness 
that might be described as “similar.” See In re Bernard L. 
Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC, 773 F.3d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 2014) (“In 
ordinary usage, the word ‘similar’ means ‘having 
characteristics in common,’ or ‘alike in substance or 
essentials.’” (quoting Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary 2120 (3d 
ed. 1993))); Ayes v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 473 F.3d 
104, 108 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Although the term ‘grant’ is not 
defined in the statute, the use of the word ‘similar’ limits the 
universe of ‘grants’ to . . . only grants bearing a family 
resemblance . . . .”). But here, the use of “director” in its legal 
rather than colloquial sense narrows the range of possible 
meanings and suggests more than slight similarity. 
                                                 
statements required by this subsection with the Commission.” 
(emphasis added)). Section 16, unlike § 77k(a)(3), invites an 
inquiry into the actual circumstances of a purported director.  
Once we accept that distinction, our holding accords 
with the release provisions Plaintiffs cite. The releases attempt 
to cover people with policymaking power and access to inside 
information, while excluding figureheads—without 
formalistic reliance on titles. Likewise, our interpretation of 
§ 77k(a)(3) includes only persons who, on the face of the 
registration statement, exercise formal power similar to 
directors. If the registration statement here described Zou and 
Downs as having that kind of power, their “observer” title 
would not absolve them. 
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A commonsense example explains why this is so. We 
might describe a “sedan” as similar to a “truck”—both are 
vehicles, after all. But an ordinary English speaker would not 
say a sedan is similar to a “light-duty pickup truck.” The use of 
a narrowing term of art that distinguishes one class of trucks 
from others connotes a likeness of specific functions—beyond 
basics like personal transportation. So too the question here is 
not whether Zou and Downs are “similar” to “directors” in 
some abstract sense. The question is rather whether they 
possess at least some of the core powers and responsibilities 
that define corporate directorship under the law of 
corporations.7  
IV 
Having defined our terms, we turn to consider what 
sources are relevant to deciding whether a person is a proper 
§ 77k(a)(3) defendant, and who ought to make that decision. 
As to the first question, the District Court held only the 
registration statement itself is relevant. We agree. It follows 
from that holding that whether one is a proper defendant under 
§ 77k(a)(3) is a question of law for the court, not a question of 
fact for the jury.  
A 
What evidence is relevant to our inquiry? Section 
77k(a)(3) asks whether a defendant is “with his consent, [ ] 
named in the registration statement as being or about to 
                                                 
7 As we explain infra in Part V, Securities Act § 6(a), 15 
U.S.C. § 77f(a) (which prescribes who must sign the 
registration statement) provides additional support for our 
conclusion that “similar” requires a likeness of formal powers. 
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become . . . [a] person performing similar functions” to a 
director. (Emphasis added). The phrase “named in the 
registration statement as” compels reference to the description 
provided there. And § 77k(a)(3)’s text, structure, surrounding 
provisions, and requirement of consent to be named all tell us 
that the inquiry stops there. 
For starters, it would be odd as a matter of logic to 
consider defendants’ real-world actions to determine whether 
they were “named” in a specified document as “about” to 
perform certain functions. To “name” a person as “about” to do 
something is to make a prediction. And § 77k(a)(3) asks only 
whether the issuer made that prediction in its registration 
statement. Whether the prediction was well-supported when it 
was made and whether it came true are irrelevant.  
Section 77k(a)(3)’s syntax leads to the same conclusion. 
To hold extrinsic evidence relevant would substitute an “and” 
for the “as”—so that once a court finds a person “named” in 
the registration statement, it then determines whether in fact 
the person’s role is, or will be, director-like. But the statute 
doesn’t say “named in the registration statement and . . . about 
to become . . . [a] person performing similar functions.” Read 
slightly differently, Plaintiffs’ preferred interpretation would 
excise the phrase “named in the registration statement as” 
altogether and rewrite § 77k(a)(3) to say “every person who, 
with his consent, is or is about to become a director [or] person 
performing similar functions.” That language too would ask 
whether Zou and Downs were in fact about to become quasi-
directors. And it would make sense then to consider extrinsic 
evidence. But § 77k(a)(3) doesn’t say that either.  
Our reading is also supported by § 77k(a)’s provision 
for expert liability, which uses language much like § 77k(a)(3):  
17 
 
Every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any 
person whose profession gives authority to a 
statement made by him, who has with his consent 
been named as having prepared or certified any 
part of the registration statement, or as having 
prepared or certified any report or valuation 
which is used in connection with the registration 
statement, with respect to the statement in such 
registration statement, report, or valuation, 
which purports to have been prepared or 
certified by him . . . .  
15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (emphases added). By making the 
“statement” the subject of the phrase “purports to have been 
prepared or certified,” § 77k(a)(4) limits the inquiry into 
whether an expert is “named as having prepared or certified” 
the statement to the face of the document in which it’s made. 
See Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 386 n.22 (explaining 
“accountants with respect to parts of a registration statement 
which they are not named as having prepared or certified” 
cannot be held liable under § 77k(a)(4) “even if [they] engaged 
in fraudulent conduct while participating in the registration 
statement”).  
Of course, there was no reason to include the “purports 
to have been prepared or certified” language in § 77k(a)(3). 
That’s because liability under § 77k(a)(3) is not limited to 
particular statements within the registration statement. But 
§ 77k(a)(4) confirms the commonsense construction that the 
phrase “named . . . as” asks only about the words of the 
document doing the naming. And § 77k(a)’s other subsections 
likewise suggest the phrase “named . . . as” has this meaning. 
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Furthermore, it’s clear Congress knew how to extend 
liability to a broader class of defendants when it wanted to—
because it did. Unlike § 77k(a)(3) and (4), two of § 77k(a)’s 
enumerated categories are phrased without reference to how a 
person is named in the registration statement. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77k(a)(2) (liability for “every person who was a director of 
(or person performing similar functions) or partner in the issuer 
at the time of the filing of the part of the registration statement 
with respect to which his liability is asserted” (emphasis 
added)); id. § 77k(a)(5) (liability for “every underwriter with 
respect to such security”). We “presum[e] that each word 
Congress uses is there for a reason,” Advocate Health Care 
Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1659 (2017), so we will 
not read the phrase “named in the registration statement as” out 
of § 77k(a)(3).8  
Finally, the requirement of consent to be named, see 
§ 77k(a)(3), confirms that our inquiry stops at the text of the 
registration statement. It is hard to see how this consent could 
be informed if a person’s status (and potential liability) were 
speculative and mutable based on facts and events beyond the 
text of the registration statement. See 5 Arnold S. Jacobs, 
Disclosure & Remedies Under the Sec. Laws § 3:17 (Dec. 
2018 update) (“Questions regarding the interpretation” of the 
phrase “performing similar functions” “rarely should arise 
                                                 
8 It cannot be that § 77k(a)(3)’s extra language adds 
merely a requirement that the registration statement disclose 
the defendant’s identity. The Securities Act already requires 
registration statements to include “the names and addresses of 
the directors or persons performing similar functions.” 
Securities Act Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(4).  
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because the person would not give consent unless he thought 
he was within the ambit of one of the terms”). 
B 
Having decided that the registration statement controls 
who is subject to § 77k(a)(3) liability, it follows that courts, not 
juries, must determine the scope of that provision and whether 
the terms of a registration statement bring a defendant within 
it. “The construction of written instruments is one of those 
things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors 
unburdened by training in exegesis.” Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996); see also 10A 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 2725 (4th ed. Sept. 2018 update) (“[I]f the only 
issues that are presented involve the legal construction of 
statutes . . . or the legal sufficiency of certain documents, 
summary judgment would be proper.” (footnotes omitted)). 
And this inquiry involves “the use of legal skills to determine,” 
Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 
1679–80 (2019), the significance of statements that are not in 
dispute.  
 Even if the inquiry included subsidiary questions of 
fact, “[u]niformity would . . . be ill served,” Markman, 517 
U.S. at 391, by submitting to juries the threshold question 
whether the face of a registration statement brings a defendant 
within § 77k(a)(3). Registration statements in public securities 
offerings are addressed to the whole investing public and are 
likely to describe putative defendants’ functions in familiar but 
technical terms of art. It is important for issuers, investors, and 
putative defendants to know the scope of quasi-director 
liability. We hold that whether a defendant is “named in the 
registration statement as being or about to become a director[ ] 
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[or] person performing similar functions,” § 77k(a)(3), is a 
question of law for the court.9   
V 
As we have explained, the function of a board of 
directors is to direct and manage the company’s affairs. 
Individual directors do this by formal voting. And because each 
director bears part of the ultimate responsibility for the 
company’s fate, each owes duties of care and loyalty and may 
be voted out for mismanagement (or for no reason at all). Zou 
and Downs’s roles, as described in the registration statement, 
are not “of a like nature or kind,” Similar, Oxford English 
Dictionary 59 (1st ed. 1933). 
Three features differentiate Zou and Downs from 
directors. First, and most fundamentally, Zou and Downs 
cannot vote for board action. Second, they are aligned with the 
                                                 
9 It’s conceivable that a registration statement’s 
description of a defendant might include ambiguous terms. A 
judge might then look to evidence of technical meaning (or to 
other extrinsic sources). While this would be factfinding 
reviewable only for clear error, see Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. 
Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 840 (2015), we think this is the 
sort of subsidiary factfinding that is “subsumed within an 
already tightly circumscribed legal analysis.” Merck Sharp & 
Dohme, 139 S. Ct. at 1680. So we decline to extend our 
Circuit’s rule in contract interpretation—that juries interpret 
ambiguous terms, see Wayne Land & Mineral Grp. LLC v. 
Delaware River Basin Comm’n, 894 F.3d 509, 528 (3d Cir. 
2018)—to this context.  
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placement agent, A&S, not Tibet. And third, their tenures are 
set to end automatically, with no opportunity to vote them out. 
Without the ability to manage the company’s affairs, Zou and 
Downs lack directors’ most basic power. As agents of Tibet’s 
placement agent, their loyalties aren’t with Tibet’s 
shareholders—and loyalty to shareholders is as vital to 
directorship as the power to manage. And unlike Tibet’s 
directors, their tenure is not subject to shareholder vote. Add to 
that the registration statement’s express provision for directors’ 
fiduciary duties, with no similar provision for Zou and Downs. 
Consider a hypothetical investment analyst for a 
research firm. Like Zou and Downs, he owes no duties to the 
issuer and is affiliated with a different entity. He might also 
enjoy special access to the issuer’s board and management. Cf. 
Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (seeking to curtail special 
access to non-public information). Or he might not. But either 
way, access to managers and directors alone does not make a 
person a quasi-director. Consider the analyst’s power to 
influence the issuer’s board. It might be substantial, depending 
on the analyst’s reputation and influence in the industry. Or it 
might not. In either case, he has the same “power” Zou and 
Downs do—the “possibility” of “significantly influenc[ing] 
the outcome of matters submitted to the Board of Directors for 
approval.” App. 178. The analyst’s influence—his power to 
persuade—might even “impact [the issuer’s] shareholders’ 
ability to impact decisions related to [its] operations.” Id. Or it 
might not. But no one would argue that our hypothetical 
analyst is in any meaningful way “similar” to a board member. 
Our conclusion is also supported by Securities Act 
§ 6(a) and the consent requirement of § 77k(a)(3). And it fits 
both the scant caselaw interpreting § 77k(a)(3) and the only 
case in which our Court has interpreted parallel language. 
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First, Securities Act § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a), which 
lists who must sign10 the registration statement, suggests 
“similarity” requires a close identity with the core functions 
we’ve described. The registration statement must be signed by 
“the majority of [the] board of directors or persons performing 
similar functions (or, if there is no board of directors or persons 
performing similar functions, by the majority of the persons or 
board having the power of management of the issuer) . . . .” 15 
U.S.C. § 77f(a) (emphasis added). This suggests that having 
“the power of management of the issuer” (a power the board 
delegates to management) is not even enough to qualify as 
“similar.” But management has far more formal power than 
Zou and Downs. 
Second, § 77k(a)(3) imposes liability only on a person 
named in the registration statement as a director or similar 
“with his consent.” Consent can’t be inferred merely by the 
appearance of one’s name in the registration statement. By 
regulation, the registration statement must include express, 
written consent, filed as an exhibit. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.438. 
Exceptions are permitted only where there is affidavit-
supported impracticability or undue hardship for the registrant. 
Id. This consent requirement suggests a level of formality 
consistent with our interpretation of “performing similar 
functions.” It would be odd for observers like Zou and Downs, 
who have no formal powers, to execute a formal consent that 
envisioned § 11 liability.  
And third, our conclusion tracks the only cases to 
interpret the phrase “performing similar functions” in 
                                                 
10 And thus become liable for misstatements under 
§ 77k(a)(1). 
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§ 77k(a)(3), as well as our Court’s lone interpretation of the 
same phrase in a different context. The two district courts to 
consider the phrase suggested it requires something like formal 
powers. See Mersay v. First Republic Corp. of Am., 43 F.R.D. 
465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (member of “executive advisory 
board” didn’t qualify, because “[m]ost probably, this phrase is 
concerned with imposing liability upon the person who is 
actually directing the affairs of the corporation, but who, for 
the purpose of avoiding liability, shuns the formal title 
‘director’”); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 
810, 812 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (“It is quite apparent that Congress 
added the ‘or any person’ provision to apply to organizations 
which did not have directors in name but did have persons who 
performed functions similar to those ordinarily performed by 
the directors of a corporation.”). 
And the only case in which our Court interpreted the 
phrase (in a different context) is likewise consistent with the 
conclusion that “performing similar functions” entails a 
similarity of formal powers and duties. In First Liberty 
Investment Group v. Nicholsberg, 145 F.3d 647 (3d Cir. 1998), 
we applied the phrase in a National Association of Securities 
Dealers arbitration provision that borrowed its language from 
the Exchange Act. We held a purportedly independent 
contractor “perform[ed] similar functions” to those of a 
“branch manager” of a broker-dealer. Id. at 651–52. Among the 
reasons why were that the broker-dealer: provided the 
contractor “facilities . . . for execution of transactions”; 
designated the contractor’s office “an entity allowed . . . to 
offer and solicit the sales of securities”; “gave [the contractor] 
geographic exclusivity . . . and agreed not to open competing 
offices without [his] prior written consent”; required the 
contractor to comply with its policies and seek prior approval 
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for securities solicitation; and forbade the contractor to transact 
with other broker-dealers. Id. at 652. 
The contractor was thus closely affiliated with the 
broker-dealer, and operated very much like a branch manager 
would—with formal powers, rights, and duties to match. See 
id. (“[T]he parties’ total relationship, including the limitations 
placed by [the broker-dealer] both on [the contractor’s] 
conduct of his business and on its own conduct of business, 
amount to . . . placing [the contractor] in much the same 
practical position that would be occupied by a branch manager 
in charge of [the broker-dealer’s] only New York metropolitan 
area office.”). Unlike that close fit, Zou and Downs’s role as 
nonvoting board observers does not put them “in much the 
same practical position,” id., as Tibet’s directors.  
Plaintiffs’ two main arguments to the contrary are 
unpersuasive. First, they contend the registration statement 
contains a “clear grant of limitless power to Appellants to 
‘significantly’ influence the ‘outcomes’ of the highest-level 
corporate decision-making . . . .” Obasi Br. 12. Far from it. 
That Zou and Downs, as nonvoting observers, “may” influence 
board decisions is not a grant of power at all. That’s so even if 
their influence turns out to be “significant.” And it’s so 
notwithstanding the observations of “an experienced investor” 
about the real-world social dynamics of boardrooms. Obasi Br. 
25–28. Simply put, the face of the registration statement 
confers no actual power upon Zou or Downs. 
The Sixth Circuit made a similar point in Bennett v. 
Durham, 683 F.3d 734 (6th Cir. 2012), a case interpreting 
“performing similar functions” language in a state blue sky 
statute. Id. at 736 (quoting Ky. Rev. Stat. § 292.480). The 
plaintiffs there argued the company’s “officers and directors 
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‘relied completely’ on [the defendant’s] work and would have 
‘structured their sales operation in any way [the defendant] 
advised.’” Id. at 738 (quoting appellate brief). The court 
rejected that argument as “suggest[ing] only that [the 
company’s] actual partners, officers and directors relied 
heavily on [the defendant], not that [he] was the one calling the 
shots.” Id.  
Finally, Plaintiffs insist the Securities Act is a remedial 
statute that we should construe broadly. That may be so, see 
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 
151 (1972), but the argument misses the mark here. Cf. SEC v. 
Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002) (“[T]he statute must not 
be construed so broadly as to convert every common-law fraud 
that happens to involve securities into a violation of 
§ 10(b) . . . .”). Congress expressly circumscribed the class of 
defendants subject to § 11 liability—and it did so for good 
reason. Section 11 “was designed to assure compliance with 
the disclosure provisions of the [Securities] Act by imposing a 
stringent standard of liability on the parties who play a direct 
role in a registered offering.” Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 
381–82 (footnote omitted); cf. Lehman Bros., 650 F.3d at 181 
(discussing limited scope of § 11 underwriter status). Plaintiffs’ 
broad construction argument relies “on the flawed premise” 
that the statute “‘pursues’ its remedial purpose ‘at all costs.’” 
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1142 
(2018) (quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 
U.S. 228, 234 (2013)). Such an approach “frustrates rather than 
effectuates legislative intent” because it 
“simplistically . . . assume[s] that whatever furthers the 
statute’s primary objective must be the law.” Rodriguez v. 
United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam). 
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Plaintiffs also overstate the concern that a broad 
construction is necessary to hold wrongdoers accountable. 
Section 11 is but one part of an overlapping web of civil 
liability provisions. Recall that Plaintiffs allege “Zou and 
Downs orchestrated the fraudulent sale of $16.5 million of 
worthless Tibet stock.” Obasi Br. 10. Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 
U.S.C. § 78j, and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, have 
been interpreted to grant a broad private right of action for 
fraud in the purchase or sale of securities. See Janus Capital 
Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 141–42 
(2011). Or take Securities Act § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77l(a)(2), which provides a right of rescission for private 
plaintiffs where a seller makes misleading statements or 
omissions in a prospectus. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 
U.S. 561, 564, 567 (1995). Securities Act § 15, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77o, provides yet another remedy—one that Plaintiffs sought 
and then abandoned. Then there’s Exchange Act § 18, 15 
U.S.C. § 78r, which provides a right of action for damages 
against “any person” who makes a false or misleading 
statement in Exchange Act filings. And Exchange Act § 9, 15 
U.S.C. § 78i, gives plaintiffs a private right of action for 
manipulation of security prices in national exchanges. See 
Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1104 
(1991). Add to all these provisions additional remedies under 
state blue sky laws and common law. Apart from these private 
remedies, the SEC also holds wrongdoers accountable through 
the many enforcement mechanisms available only to it.  
For these reasons, “we will not presume with [Plaintiffs] 
that any result consistent with their account of the statute’s 
overarching goal must be the law but will presume more 
modestly instead ‘that the legislature says what it means and 
means what it says.’” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA 
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Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725 (2017) (quoting Dodd v. United 
States, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005)).  
* * * 
Because Zou and Downs were not “named in the 
registration statement as being or about to become [ ] 
director[s] [or] person[s] performing similar functions,” we 
will reverse the District Court’s denial of summary judgment 
and direct the entry of judgment for Zou and Downs. 
 1 
 
COWEN, dissenting 
 
 The District Court certified the following question for 
interlocutory appeal: 
Can Defendants be potentially liable under 
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, each 
as a “person performing similar functions” to a 
director, in light of Defendants’ role as board 
observers who could (but did not necessarily 
have to) significantly influence the outcome of 
matters submitted to the board of directors for 
approval? 
(2/21/18 Order at 2.)  Because I agree with the District Court 
that this question must be answered in the affirmative, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 I do not really take issue with the basic definitions of 
“director” and “similar” offered by the majority, although I 
do reject its application of these concepts.  “[I]n a more 
specialized sense related to business organizations, 
[‘director’] could mean ‘[a] member of a board appointed to 
direct or manage the affairs of a commercial corporation or 
company.’  [Director, Oxford English Dictionary 392 (1st ed. 
1933)]; see Directors, Black’s Law Dictionary 581 (3d ed. 
1933) (defining ‘director’ as a ‘person[ ] appointed or elected 
according to law, authorized to manage and direct the affairs 
of a corporation or company’).”  (Majority Opinion at 10.)  
The District Court likewise “defines ‘director’ as [inter alia] 
‘[a] person appointed or elected to sit on a board that manages 
the affairs of a corporation or other organization by electing 
and exercising control over its officers.’”  Dartell v. Tibet 
Pharms., Inc., Civil Action No. 14-3620, 2017 WL 1944106, 
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at *9 (D.N.J. May 10, 2017) (footnote omitted) (quoting 
Director, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)).  In 
general, the term “similar” is “most aptly defined as ‘[h]aving 
a marked resemblance or likeness; of a like nature or kind’” 
(id. at 14 (quoting Similar, Oxford English Dictionary 59 (1st 
ed. 1933))).  See, e.g., id. (“The Court will also apply the 
ordinary meaning of ‘similar,’ which is defined as ‘having 
characteristics in common.’ See Similar, [Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary] (2016).”).    
 Even if Section 11(a)(3) of the Securities Act thereby 
requires more than some slight similarity, the majority fails to 
recognize the expansive scope of this “similar” language.  
Congress chose to use this word instead of the terms 
“identical” or the “same”—or even “essentially identical” or 
“essentially the same.”  We should honor Congress’s choice 
of such language, which the majority acknowledges could 
encompass varying degrees of likeness.  According to the 
majority, “[t]he question is rather whether they possess at 
least some of the core powers and responsibilities that define 
corporate directorship under the law of corporations.”  (Id. at 
15 (footnote omitted).)  However, the statutory language 
plainly requires that the individual merely perform functions 
“similar” to, i.e., “‘of a like nature or kind’” as (id. at 20 
(quoting Similar, Oxford English Dictionary 59 (1st ed. 
1933)), the functions of a director.  The majority’s approach 
actually resembles the formulation set forth by the British 
Companies Act of 1929, which defines “director” as 
including “any person occupying the position of director by 
whatever name called.”  (JA818 (comparing statutory 
language).)  Although the Securities Act was modeled on the 
British Companies Act, see, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 
513 U.S. 561, 599 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), Congress 
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did not follow Parliament’s “director by whatever name 
called” approach.  It instead adopted what could only be 
considered a more sweeping “similar” formulation.   
 More broadly, the Court should not overlook the 
purposes of the 1933 Securities Act as well as Section 11 in 
particular.  The “basic purpose” of this legislation was “to 
provide greater protection to purchasers of registered 
securities.”  Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 
375, 383 (1983).  Section 11 was then “designed to assure 
compliance with the disclosure provisions of the Act by 
imposing a stringent standard of liability on the parties who 
play a direct role in a registered offering.”  Id. at 381-82 
(footnotes omitted).  Admittedly, Section 11 actions (which, 
as the District Court acknowledged, implicate virtually 
absolute liability) can only be brought against certain 
defendants (which do not include, for example, corporate 
officers other than as specified).  See, e.g., id. at 382 & n.13, 
386 n.22.  Nevertheless, Section 11 still encompasses a wide 
range of defendants, including every person who signed the 
registration statement; every person who was a director of (or 
person performing similar functions) or partner in the issuer 
at the time of filing; every accountant, engineer, appraiser, or 
any person whose profession gives authority to a statement 
made by him, who has with his consent been named as having 
prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or 
as having prepared or certified any report or valuation used in 
connection with the registration statement, with respect to the 
statement in such document, which purports to have been 
prepared or certified by him; and every underwriter with 
respect to such security.  The Supreme Court has “repeatedly 
recognized that securities laws combating fraud should be 
construed ‘not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to 
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effectuate [their] remedial purposes.’”  Id. at 386-87 (quoting 
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 195 
(1963)).  We should thereby specifically consider whether the 
defendant is named in the registration statement as being or 
about to become a person performing similar functions to a 
director with respect to the drafting, publication, or accuracy 
of the registration statement itself.  Furthermore, “Plaintiffs 
point to two Exchange Act SEC interpretive releases they say 
suggest a broader definition.”  (Majority Opinion at 12 n.6 
(citing Ownership Reports & Trading by Officers, Directors 
& Principal Sec. Holders, Exchange Act Release No. 17991, 
1991 WL 292000 (Feb. 21, 1991); Interpretive Release on 
Rules Applicable to Insider Reporting & Trading, Exchange 
Act Release No. 18114, 1981 WL 31301 (Sept. 24, 1981)).  
“Those releases say a person’s title should not determine 
‘whether an advisory, emeritus or honorary director is a 
director for Section 16 purposes,’ Release No. 17991, 1991 
WL 292000, at *4, and that the focus should instead be on 
whether the person performs duties likely to make him privy 
to inside information, see id.; Release No. 18114, 1981 WL 
31301, at *5 & n.15.”  (Id.)  While these releases implicate 
the Exchange Act and access to inside information, they 
certainly are consistent with the expansive statutory language 
and legislative purposes at issue in this appeal.  In fact, the 
majority looks elsewhere in its opinion to “the Exchange Act 
definition of director” (id. at 10 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 
78c(a)(7)), and Defendants likewise rely on the SEC’s 
interpretation.   
 Accordingly, a person may be named as performing 
similar functions to a director even if he or she does not 
possess the directors’ “formal power to direct and manage a 
corporation, and the responsibilities and duties that 
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accompany those powers” (id. at 11-12 (footnote omitted)).  
On the contrary, he or she is a person named in the 
registration statement as being or about to become a person 
performing similar functions if, pursuant to this statement, he 
or she possesses powers or abilities that are of a like nature or 
kind as the power to direct or manage the affairs of the 
corporation.  As the District Court aptly explained, “a 
defendant may be held liable if he had the ability to exercise 
similar control and management as a director when the 
registration statement at issue was filed or was named as 
about to assume such a role in the registration statement, even 
if the corporation at issue also had a board of directors or 
persons about to be named directors.”  Dartell, 2017 WL 
1944106, at *9.  Applying this approach to the Tibet 
registration statement, I have no difficulty concluding that 
Zou and Downs are proper Section 11(a)(3) defendants.1     
                                              
1 I agree with the majority that, in considering a claim 
under Section 11(a)(3), we must look to what is actually 
stated in the registration statement (as opposed to the 
defendant’s real-world actions).  I, however, do not agree that 
“whether one is a proper defendant under § 77k(a)(3) is a 
question of law for the court, not a question of fact for the 
jury.”  (Majority Opinion at 15.)  While judges often do 
construe written instruments, there are some clear exceptions.  
For example, if a contract is susceptible to multiple 
reasonable interpretations, the contract is ambiguous, and the 
jury is tasked with resolving that ambiguity.  See, e.g., 
Baldwin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 636 F.3d 69, 76 (3d 
Cir. 2011); Ram Const. Co. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 
1049, 1052 (3d Cir. 1984).  The whole concept of similarity 
also appears to trigger the sort of open-ended factual 
 6 
 
 “[T]he registration statement explained ‘they [Zou and 
Downs] may nevertheless significantly influence the outcome 
of matters submitted to the Board of Directors for approval.”  
(Id. at 4 (quoting JA178).)  Specifically, the “Management” 
section of the statement (JA226) included a subsection 
addressing the “Relationship with our Placement Agent”: 
                                                                                                     
assessment that a jury would usually be expected to 
undertake, i.e., deciding whether something is more or less 
“similar’ to something else and whether this similarity is 
enough to satisfy the statutory scheme.  In this case, Zou “was 
an early investor in Tibet and the sole director of [China 
Tibetan], a wholly owned subsidiary of Tibet.”  (Id. at 4.)  
“Tibet’s ability to control Yunnan flowed through China 
Tibetan.”  (Id.)  It was Zou who told the placement agent and 
Downs about Tibet, and the two Defendants “then worked 
together to bring Tibet public.”  (Id.)  Zou opened China 
Tibetan’s HSBC Hong Kong bank account, and his name 
remained on the account.  Defendants insist that Zou’s name 
was supposed to be removed, he did not make any 
withdrawals or transfers into or out of the China Tibetan 
account, Tibet’s CEO and its cashier had complete control 
over the account, and Tibet had full control over the IPO 
proceeds, which were deposited into another account held by 
Tibet.  However, more than $4 million was deposited into 
China Tibetan’s account just two days after the proceeds were 
transferred to Tibet’s HSBC Hong Kong account, and 
approximately $3.5 million in cash was then withdrawn from 
the China Tibetan account less than a month later.  In any 
event, I believe that Plaintiffs prevail even if the present 
inquiry is characterized as a question of law for the courts to 
decide.          
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In connection with this offering, we have 
agreed to allow our Placement Agent to 
designate two non-voting observers to our 
Board of Directors until the earlier of the date 
that:   
• The investors that purchase shares in this 
offering beneficially own less than 5% of 
our outstanding shares; or 
• The trading price per share is at least $24 
per share for any consecutive 15 trading 
day period. 
It is anticipated that Mr. Downs, our 
Placement Agent’s Senior Vice President, and 
Mr. Hayden Zou will serve as the Placement 
Agent’s observers to our Board of Directors.  
Although our placement agent’s 
observers will not be able to vote, they may 
nevertheless influence the outcome of matters 
submitted to the Board of Directors for 
approval.  We have agreed to reimburse the 
observers for their expenses for attending our 
Board meetings, subject to a maximum 
reimbursement of $6,000 per meeting and 
$12,000 annually, which amount is not more 
than the reimbursement payable to our 
directors.  The observer will be required to 
certify that such travel expenses are not 
reimbursed by any other party.  We will also 
pay observers the same amount as our 
independent directors receive. 
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(JA230.)  A similar subsection was included as part of the 
“RISK FACTORS” discussion (JA152): 
We will have an ongoing relationship with 
our Placement Agent that may impact our 
shareholders’ ability to impact decisions 
related to our operations. 
 In connection with this offering, we have 
agreed to allow our Placement Agent to 
designate two non-voting observers to our 
Board of Directors until the earlier of the date 
that:  
 (i) the investors that purchase 
shares in this offering beneficially 
own less than five percent (5%) of 
our outstanding shares; or 
(ii) the trading price per share is at 
least four (4) times the offering 
price for any consecutive 15 
trading day period. 
Although our Placement Agent’s 
observers will not be able to vote, they may 
nevertheless significantly influence the outcome 
of matters submitted to the Board of Directors 
for approval.  We have agreed to reimburse the 
observers for their expenses for attending our 
Board meetings, subject to a maximum 
reimbursement of $6,000 per meeting and 
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$12,000 annually, which amount is not more 
than the reimbursement payable to our 
directors.  The observer will be required to 
certify that such travel expenses are not 
reimbursed by any other party.  We will also 
pay observers the same amount as our 
independent directors receive.  As of the date of 
this prospectus, Mr. L. McCarthy Downs III 
and Mr. Hayden Zou are serving as our 
Placement Agent’s observers to our Board of 
Directors.  See “Management – Board of 
Directors Observer.” 
(JA178.)   
According to the majority, there are three features 
differentiating Defendants from directors:  (1) “First, and 
most fundamentally, Zou and Downs cannot vote for board 
action” while individual directors direct and manage company 
affairs by means of formal voting (Majority Opinion at 20); 
(2) they are aligned with the placement agent as opposed to 
Tibet and its shareholders; and (3) their tenures are set to end 
automatically without any opportunity for the shareholders to 
vote them out.  There are some obvious differences between 
observers as described by the registration statement and 
directors (after all, even the registration statement 
acknowledged Defendants’ inability to vote), and I agree with 
the District Court that “simply being named a board observer 
did not open Downs or Zou up to Section 11 liability because 
the title does not indicate that such a position necessarily 
performs similar functions to a director,” Dartell, 2017 WL 
1944106, at *10.  However, the registration statement went 
beyond merely identifying two non-voting board observers.  
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It also indicated that:  (1) most importantly, Defendants may 
nevertheless significantly influence the outcome of matters 
submitted to the Board of Directors for approval; (2) 
Defendants are aligned with the placement agent in exercising 
this significant influence over Board action—serving as the 
placement agent’s own “eyes and ears at Board meetings” as 
Defendants put it (Appellants’ Reply Brief at 12 (footnote 
omitted))—and could not be voted out by the shareholders; 
(3) in order to observe and exercise their significant 
influence, Defendants implicitly have the right to inside 
information, to attend meetings of the Board of Directors, and 
to speak or otherwise share their opinions; and (4) Defendants 
are entitled to the same pay as “our independent directors 
receive” (JA178, JA230) and (like the members of the Board 
of Directors) are also eligible for reimbursement for attending 
Board meetings (although their reimbursement is capped).   
Given the plain language of the registration statement, 
Defendants are clearly named as possessing powers or 
abilities that are of a like nature or kind as the directors’ 
power to direct or manage the affairs of the corporation: 
The prospectus does not define any of 
the words used to describe the Board 
Observers’ role.  As a result, the Court turns to 
dictionary definitions.  First, the statement 
indicates that Board Observers would have the 
ability to influence the Tibet Board.  
“Influence” is defined as “the power or capacity 
of causing an effect in indirect or intangible 
ways.”  Influence, [Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary] (2016).  Next, the description 
provides that this influence would be 
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significant.  “Significant” means “of a 
noticeably or measurably large amount.”  
Significant, [Merriam-Webster Dictionary] 
(2016).  Thus, the language “significantly 
influence” indicates that the two Board 
Observers could play a critical role in board 
decisions. 
Id. at *10.  In fact, the registration statement “does not place a 
limit on whom or what they may influence,” id., and 
Defendants’ thereby may “significantly” influence the 
outcome of all matters submitted to the Board—which, 
according to the statement, “makes all relevant [Tibet] 
decisions” (JA229).  In turn, “our Placement Agent’s 
observers” were appointed “[i]n connection with this 
offering” (JA178, JA230), indicating that Defendants’ 
capacity for significant influence is linked to the public 
offering itself.  See, e.g., Herman & MacLean, 459 U.S. at 
381-82 (observing that Section 11 was “designed to assure 
compliance with the disclosure provisions of the Act by 
imposing a stringent standard of liability on the parties who 
play a direct role in a registered offering” (footnotes 
omitted)).  Furthermore, similar compensation points to 
similarity in functions.  After all, compensation (at least 
theoretically) reflects the sort of work the individual has 
performed. 
According to the majority, “[t]hat Zou and Downs, as 
nonvoting observers, ‘may’ influence board decisions is not a 
grant of power at all.”  (Majority Opinion at 24.)  It compares 
Defendants to a hypothetical investment analyst for a research 
firm, who might (or might not) have special access to the 
issuer’s board of directors and management, power to 
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influence the board based on the analyst’s reputation and 
influence in the industry, and whose “influence—his power to 
persuade—might even ‘impact [the issuer’s] shareholders’ 
ability to impact decisions related to [its] operations’” (id. at 
21 (quoting JA178)).  However, we do not—and should not—
decide whether this imaginary analyst is named as being or 
about to become a director or a person performing similar 
functions.  In any event, there is no indication that the analyst 
resembles “our Placement Agent observers” (JA230) and is 
entitled to similar compensation as the directors.  The 
majority continues to insist that Section 11(a)(3) “includes 
only persons who, on the face of the registration statement, 
exercise formal power similar to directors” (Majority Opinion 
at 14 n.6)—even though someone need not have any “formal 
powers” to perform similar functions under Section 11(a)(3).  
In fact, influence is itself a form of power, defined as “the 
power or capacity of causing an effect in indirect or 
intangible ways.”  Influence, Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
(2016) (emphasis added).  Under the plain language of the 
registration statement, such “significant” power over the 
outcome of matters submitted to the Board of Directors for 
approval is of a like nature or kind to the formal powers that 
directors possess to direct and manage the company’s affairs.  
In fact, Defendants may have more real power than the 
nominal members of the Board of Directors.  The majority 
recognizes that directors act as a board and that it is the board 
of directors that manages the corporation’s affairs.  In short, 
an individual director or group of directors may vote and lose 
on matters submitted to the Board for approval and thereby 
fail to influence the outcome of such matters while 
Defendants “may nevertheless significantly influence the 
outcome of [the] matter[ ]” (JA178).  In such circumstances, 
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the statutory language and purpose plainly mandate holding 
such individuals liable under Section 11(a)(3).2 
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the District 
Court’s denial of summary judgment.3  
                                              
2 I also am not persuaded by the other arguments raised 
by the majority opinion, including the case law it cites.  In 
First Liberty Investment Group v. Nicholsberg, 145 F.3d 647 
(3d Cir. 1998), this Court did not consider whether a 
defendant was named as being or about to become a person 
performing similar functions as a director.  Instead, it 
“applied a phrase in a National Association of Securities 
Dealers arbitration provision” (Majority Opinion at 23) and, 
in any event, “held a purportedly independent contractor 
‘perform[ed] similar functions’ to those of a ‘branch 
manager’ of a broker-dealer” (id. (quoting First Liberty, 145 
F.3d at 651-52)).  Applying a state blue sky statute, the Sixth 
Circuit explained that “Clayton offered no facts on summary 
judgment from which we could infer that Durham did 
anything beyond what would be expected of a securities 
attorney providing run-of-the-mine legal services.”  Bennett 
v. Durham, 683 F.3d 734, 738 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Clayton’s 
brief on appeal seeks to add more, but the effort is too little 
and too late.”).  The district court decisions, in turn, read the 
statutory language too narrowly, taking it to mean persons 
performing the same functions as directors while shunning 
the directorial title.  See, e.g., Mersay v. First Republic Corp. 
of Am., 43 F.R.D. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Lockheed 
Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810, 812 (S.D. Cal. 
1952).  Finally, I note that Defendants have failed to argue 
that they never consented to be named in the registration 
statement.    
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3 Defendants also assert that Section 11(a)(3), at least 
as interpreted by the District Court and Plaintiffs, would be 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to them.  Given my 
analysis of this statutory provision, I do not agree that it 
“‘fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that 
his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.’”  
Papachristous v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 
(1972) (quoting United States v. Hariss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 
(1954)).   
